Quantum Tough - Revision history

Fireduck at 05:10, 20 January 2025

2025-01-20T05:10:20Z

Fireduck: /* Where we are going */

2018-10-31T20:30:18Z

‎Where we are going

Fireduck at 20:16, 31 October 2018

2018-10-31T20:16:50Z

Fireduck at 20:07, 31 October 2018

2018-10-31T20:07:22Z

Fireduck at 20:06, 31 October 2018

2018-10-31T20:06:38Z

Fireduck: Created page with "==Terminology== ==Where we are== It is estimated by people much smarter than I that 256-bit elliptic curve (like bitcoin uses) could be broken by a quantum computer with abo..."

2018-10-31T19:56:13Z

Created page with "==Terminology== ==Where we are== It is estimated by people much smarter than I that 256-bit elliptic curve (like bitcoin uses) could be broken by a quantum computer with abo..."

New page

==Terminology==

==Where we are==

It is estimated by people much smarter than I that 256-bit elliptic curve (like bitcoin uses) could be broken by a quantum computer with about 1600 qubits. RSA is expected to take 2x the key size (in bits) in qubits.

So a reasonable long term storage multisignature scheme might be a 3of3 consisting of:

* standard secp256k1 - in case someone breaks factoring to break RSA
* RSA 8192-bit - in case someone builds a quantum computer with a few thousand qubits
* DSTU 4145 - just to include something a bit different

This is enabled in the SnowBlossomClient. Simply put "key_mode=qhard" in your configuration before you make your wallet.

[https://explorer.snowblossom.org/?search=5dc53f864b6d060f218284121e67c3da85ede422ebe28786510dd3ea371c79b0 QHard TX]

Note: the public keys and signature (which need to be included in a spending transaction will be large for that large of RSA). A transaction spending such a scheme would be at least 4k plus normal transaction overhead, so probably around 4.4k. Compare to a regular standard EC transaction, which is around 270 bytes.

So it might cost more in fees but could easily be worth it.

Also, since Snowblossom is designed to support multiple signing algorithms, if someone comes up with a new signing method it can easily be added.

* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography#Quantum_computing_attacks EC - Quantum_computing_attacks]
* [https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/35137/how-many-qubits-are-required-to-break-rsa-2048-or-4096-with-a-universal-quantum how-many-qubits-are-required-to-break-rsa-2048-or-4096-with-a-universal-quantum]

@@ Line 6: / Line 6: @@
 Previously we used the term quantum resistant, which was in error.  That is not the term for what we have going on (currently).
-==Where we are==
+==Where we started==
 It is estimated by people much smarter than I that 256-bit elliptic curve (like bitcoin uses) could be broken by a quantum computer with about 1600 qubits. RSA is expected to take 2x the key size (in bits) in qubits.
@@ Line 31: / Line 31: @@
-==Where we are going==
+==Where we are now==
-We are watching the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography process: [https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography/Round-1-Submissions]
+Having watched the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography process, we have adopted the finalists into Snowblossom.
-Since Snowblossom is designed to support multiple signing algorithms, if someone comes up with a new signing method it can easily be added, that is assuming it follows the standard form for signing and verification.  So we are keeping an eye on the NIST process and hope to include any finalists there once they are ready.
+Users will have to create new wallets to use these keys.  See [[Wallet Types]]

@@ Line 35: / Line 35: @@
 We are watching the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography process: [https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography/Round-1-Submissions]
-When there are finalists we will l
+Since Snowblossom is designed to support multiple signing algorithms, if someone comes up with a new signing method it can easily be added, that is assuming it follows the standard form for signing and verification.  So we are keeping an eye on the NIST process and hope to include any finalists there once they are ready.
 It is possible that the winner or winners will be state-full algorithms that require more data to be tracked or have other requirements that will make them more difficult to add to Snowblossom, however with our flexible protobuf based protocol design we are confident that it can be done.
 So in short, once the algorithms are ready and vetted we will add them to Snowblossom and get to full Quantum Resistant or even Quantum Safe.

@@ Line 36: / Line 36: @@
 Since Snowblossom is designed to support multiple signing algorithms, if someone comes up with a new signing method it can easily be added, that is assuming it follows the standard form for signing and verification.
-It is always possible that the winner or winners will be state-full algorithms or have other requirements that will make them more difficult to add to Snowblossom, however with our flexible protobuf based protocol design we are confident that it can be done.
+It is possible that the winner or winners will be state-full algorithms that require more data to be tracked or have other requirements that will make them more difficult to add to Snowblossom, however with our flexible protobuf based protocol design we are confident that it can be done.
 So in short, once the algorithms are ready and vetted we will add them to Snowblossom and get to full Quantum Resistant or even Quantum Safe.

@@ Line 27: / Line 27: @@
 * [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography#Quantum_computing_attacks EC - Quantum_computing_attacks]
 * [https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/35137/how-many-qubits-are-required-to-break-rsa-2048-or-4096-with-a-universal-quantum how-many-qubits-are-required-to-break-rsa-2048-or-4096-with-a-universal-quantum]
 ==Where we are going==

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 ==Terminology==
 ==Where we are==
@@ Line 19: / Line 24: @@
 So it might cost more in fees but could easily be worth it.
 * [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography#Quantum_computing_attacks EC - Quantum_computing_attacks]
 * [https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/35137/how-many-qubits-are-required-to-break-rsa-2048-or-4096-with-a-universal-quantum how-many-qubits-are-required-to-break-rsa-2048-or-4096-with-a-universal-quantum]